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CANADA AND INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION: THREE PROMINENT
ISSUES—ICSID RATIFICATION,
CONSTITUENT SUBDIVISIONS, AND
HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION
Barry Leon
Andrew McDougall
John Siwiec*
INTRODUCTION
The large majority of investor-state disputes arise within the
context of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)—known as Foreign
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs) in Canada. 1
BITs provide standards of protection for investors from a treaty state
and their investments in another treaty state. They also provide
procedural mechanisms for the settlement of disputes through
arbitration directly between the investor and the host state. Canada is
currently a party to twenty-four FIPAs2 and four Free Trade
* Barry Leon (bleon@perlaw.ca) and Andrew McDougall
(amcdougall@perlaw.ca) are partners and John Siwiec (jsiwiec@perlaw.ca) is
an associate in the International Arbitration Group at Perley-Robertson, Hill &
McDougall LLP in Ottawa, Canada (http://www.perlaw.ca/en/expertise/
international-arbitration). Barry Leon is Chair of ICC Canada. Both Barry Leon
and Andrew McDougall serve as arbitrators, and all three authors serve as
counsel in international arbitrations. The authors are grateful to Falon Miligan
and Conor Cronin for their assistance with this article.
1
Investor-State Disputes Arising from Investment Treaties: A Review,
UNCTAD S ERIES ON INTERNATIONAL P OLICIES FOR D EVELOPMENT,
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20054_en.pdf.
2
Listing of Canada’s Existing FIPAs, F OREIGN AFFAIRS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE C ANADA, available at http://www.international.gc.ca/
trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/fipa_list.aspx?lang=
en&menu_id=14&view=d (last modified Sept. 26, 2011). Canada has signed
but not yet ratified FIPAs with South Africa, Kuwait and El Salvador. Canada
is also negotiating FIPAs with, inter alia, China, India, Tanzania, Mali, and
Bahrain. Canada’s Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements
(FIPAs): Canada’s FIPA Program, F OREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL
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Agreements (FTAs) that provide for investor-state arbitration, most
notably Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)3 between Canada, the United States and Mexico. For ease of
reference, both FIPAs and FTAs that include investor-state arbitration
will be referred to as Investment Treaty Agreements (ITAs).
This article addresses three issues of particular interest regarding
Canada’s experience with investor-state arbitration. The first section
examines the fact that Canada has not ratified the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States (ICSID Convention)4 and is therefore not a member of the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
The second section addresses an issue that Canada faces as a federal
state with ITAs. Increasingly, Canada has had to foot the bill for the
measures its provinces and territories have taken that have been
contrary to Canada’s obligations under NAFTA Chapter Eleven.
Debate exists over who should ultimately be held to pay for damages
awarded through investor-state arbitration in these kinds of cases. The
third section looks at how Canada has emerged as a leader in defending
investment treaty claims relating to health and environmental
protection regulation. Canada has had varied experiences dealing with
such claims. However, recent decisions impacting Canada seem to
indicate that a state’s investment treaty obligations should not impede
its ability to regulate in the public interest. This article concludes that,
although Canada has room to improve in certain areas related to
investment treaty arbitration, the investment treaty system largely
works.

TRADE C ANADA, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/index.aspx?view=d (last modified Sept. 26,
2011).
3
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, U.S.-Can-Mex., 1992,
32 I.L.M. 605, 639-49 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
4
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter
ICSID Convention], available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/
Volume%20575/volume-575-I-8359-English.pdf.; see also Markus Koehnen &
Robert Wisner, The Arbitration Review of the Americas: Canada, GLOBAL
ARBITRATION REVIEW, available at http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com
/reviews/32/sections/115/chapters/1204/canada/.
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CANADA AND THE ICSID CONVENTION

ITAs typically contain the host state’s consent to arbitrate and
provide the means by which a disputing investor can submit a claim.
As investor-state arbitration has evolved, the ICSID Convention has
established a widely accepted method for the adjudication of investorstate disputes. The ICSID Convention was formulated by the World
Bank in the 1960s, and has risen to prominence as 147 states have
ratified the Convention, while an additional 10—including Canada—
have signed but not yet ratified it.5
As is made clear in its preamble, the ICSID Convention is focused
on “the need for international cooperation for economic development,
and the role of private international investment” and “the possibility
that from time to time disputes may arise in connection with such
investment between” a foreign investor and the state in which the
foreign investor has invested.6 The ICSID Convention provides a
system for investor-state dispute settlement by offering standard
clauses, detailed rules of procedure and institutional support, which
extends to the selection of arbitrators and to the conduct of arbitration
proceedings.7 Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention states that “[t]he
jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any
constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to
the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State,
which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the
Centre.” 8

5
ICSID, List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the
Convention (May 5, 2011), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&langua
ge=English. Membership in ICSID is not without controversy as in the last five
years both Bolivia (3 November 2007) and Ecuador (7 January 2010) have
withdrawn from the Convention. ICSID Annual Report 2007, 4 (2007),
available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
ICSIDPublicationsRH&action=ViewAnnualReports&year=2007_Eng; ICSID
Annual Report 2010, 9 (2010), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewAnnualRep
orts&year=2010_Eng.
6
ICSID, supra note 4, preamble.
7
See RUDOLPH DOLZER & C HRISTOPH S CHREUER , P RINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL I NVESTMENT LAW, at 223 (2008).
8
ICSID, supra note 4, art. 25(1).
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Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of ICSID is that it provides
a binding agreement that Convention members will comply with an
arbitral award rendered in a dispute. 9 Each Contracting State to the
ICSID Convention is required to recognize an ICSID award as binding
and equivalent to a judgment of the highest court in their country. 10
Moreover, ICSID awards are not open to appeal and are subject to
limited review only by a second ICSID tribunal, known as an ICSID
annulment committee, rather than by any country’s courts. 11
ICSID also adopted Additional Facility Rules that authorize the
ICSID Secretariat to administer certain categories of proceedings
between states and nationals of other states that fall outside the scope of
the ICSID Convention.12 In particular, the Additional Facility Rules
cover arbitration proceedings for investment disputes where only one of
the parties is a Contracting State to the ICSID Convention or a national
of a Contracting State. A glaring difference, and disadvantage in the
eyes of foreign investors, between the ICSID Convention and the
Additional Facility Rules is that an award rendered under the
Additional Facility Rules can be subject to review by national courts at
the place of enforcement whereas an ICSID tribunal award cannot. 13
Given that the ICSID Convention has achieved such wide
acceptance, one would expect that Canada—a G8 and G20 country
with the desire to attract foreign investment and with so many
businesses and individuals that invest internationally and engage in
international projects—would be a party to it. ICSID membership
would benefit Canada’s international investors and enhance Canada’s
reputation as a foreign investor-friendly country by giving foreign

9

ICSID, supra note 4, art. 53(1) (“The award shall be binding on the
parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except
those provided for in this Convention. Each party shall abide by and comply
with the terms of the award except to the extent that enforcement shall have
been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this Convention.”).
10
Id.
11
See ICSID, supra note 4, arts. 50-55.
12
Schedule C to the Additional Facility Rules sets out the Arbitration
(Additional Facility) Rules. The Additional Facility Rules were created by the
Administrative Council of ICSID on September 27, 1978. ICSID, Rules
Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the
Secretariat of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes [hereinafter Additional Facility Rules], available at http://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/facility/AFR_English-final.pdf.
13
Compare Additional Facility Rules, supra note 12, arts. 52-57, with
ICSID, supra note 4, arts 50-55.
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investors in Canada access to the protections and benefits of ICSID
arbitration.
A. CANADA’S INVESTMENT TREATY PRACTICE
Canada’s ITAs generally provide that an investor can submit a
claim to arbitration under four sets of rules: (i) the ICSID Arbitration
Rules; (ii) the ICSID Additional Facility Rules; (iii) the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration
Rules; or, (iv) another body of rules such as the London Court of
International Arbitration (LCIA) Arbitration Rules. 14
Although ICSID arbitration is specified in Canada’s ITAs as a
potential dispute resolution mechanism, Canada has not ratified the
ICSID Convention. As a result, both Canadian investors investing
abroad and foreign investors in Canada cannot invoke the ICSID
Convention to govern their arbitration. Canada’s reference to the
ICSID Convention in its ITAs suggests that Canada intends to one day
become a member. However, the fact remains that the ICSID
Convention has been open for signature since 1965 and Canada has yet
to ratify the treaty.
This is not to say that there has not been any movement by Canada.
On December 15, 2006, Canada signed the ICSID Convention, and
Canada’s federal government passed implementing legislation to ratify
the Convention in March 2008.15 However, the Canadian federal
government has yet to issue an order that would implement it. The
delay in implementation can largely be attributed to the fact that only
four of ten provinces (British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador,
Ontario, and Saskatchewan) and two of three territories (Nunavut and

14
See NAFTA, supra note 3; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection
of Investments, Can.-Thai., art. 13, Sept. 28, 1998, available at
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/
pdfs/THAILAND-E.PDF, Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments. Can.-Jordan, art. 27, June 28 2009, http://www.international.
gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/jordanagreement-jordanie-accord.aspx?lang=eng&view=d.
15
ICSID, supra note 4.
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Northwest Territories) have passed legislation to implement the
Convention.16
Of the provinces yet to adopt supporting legislation, Alberta and
Quebec stand out. The benefits of ICSID membership to these
provinces could be significant given the nature of their economies and
the international involvement of their companies. Both provinces have
vast natural resources including oil and gas, hydro-electric power and
forestry. They also have companies in these sectors and in others, such
as aerospace and engineering, which are active around the world. As
discussed below, Alberta and Quebec have never indicated that they
oppose the substance of the Convention, leading some to believe that
they are using their resistance to adopt supporting legislation as a
means to seek concessions in other areas of federal-provincial relations.
B. CANADA’S FEDERALIST STRUCTURE
Before ratifying the ICSID Convention, it appears that Canada
would prefer to have the support of all of its provinces and territories
given Canada’s federal structure.17 As in most federal states, powers
are allocated by Canada’s constitution between its federal government
and its ten provinces and three territories.18 Canada’s constitution
allocates treaty-making authority at the federal level.19 However, when
the subject matter of a treaty is in a field in which Canada’s provinces
16
See Settlement of International Investment Disputes Act, S.B.C. 2006,
c. 16 (Can. B.C.); Settlement of International Investment Disputes Act, S.N.L.
2006, c S-13.3 (Can. N.L.); Settlement of International Disputes Act, S.O.
1999, c. 12, Schedule D (Can. Ont.); Settlement of International Investment
Disputes Act, S.S. 2006, c. S-47.2 (Can. Sask.); Settlement of International
Investment Disputes Act, S.Nu. 2006, c. 13 (Can. Nun.); Settlement of
International Investment Disputes Act, S.N.W.T. 2009, c. 15 (Can. N.W.T.)
17
See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in
R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 5 (Can.) [hereinafter Constitution].
18
Id. ss. 91 & 92.
19
The federal government’s treaty-making authority is not explicitly
conferred under any constitutional provision though is a power that is
recognized to have devolved upon it. This stems from Canada’s British
tradition, where international relations are a prerogative of the Crown, which,
in Canada, is exercised by the federal executive branch of the government as
the Crown’s representative. See LAURA BARNETT, LEGAL LEGIS. AFFAIRS DIV.,
CANADA’S APPROACH TO THE TREATY MAKING PROCESS (2008),
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0845-e.htm.; see
also Capital Cities Commc’ns Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television Comm’n,
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 141 (Can.).
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and territories have authority in accordance with the constitution,20 the
provinces and territories have the power to implement the treaty. 21
Whether constitutionally, by practice, or as a matter of political
pragmaticism, the federal government seeks provincial and territorial
support when the subject matter of a treaty includes areas that fall
within their jurisdiction.22 Because the ICSID Convention relates to
areas of provincial and territorial jurisdiction, including “the
administration of justice” and “property and civil rights,” provincial
and territorial implementing legislation is needed or at least desirable
before Canada’s ratification.23
This is not the first time Canada has been slow to ratify a treaty
relating to international arbitration. Canada took almost thirty years to
ratify the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention).24 Entered into force
in June 1959, the New York Convention provides common legislative
and judicial standards for the recognition of arbitration agreements as
well as standards for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards.25 However, unlike with the ICSID Convention, once
Canada’s federal government decided to sign the New York
Convention, it quickly received provincial and territorial support.26
Canada ratified the New York Convention in August 1986.27

20

See Constitution, ss. 91 & 92.
See Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. Ontario (Att’y Gen.), (1937) 1 D.L.R. 673
(Can.) (Labour Conventions Case); see also PETER W. HOGG, Q.C.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, 11.5 (b), (Carswell, 5th ed. Supp. 2007).
22
BARNETT, supra note 19.
23
ICSID, supra note 4 (The ICSID Convention addresses issues of
arbitral procedure and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, both
of which fall within provincial jurisdiction over the administration of justice
(ss. 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867) and property and civil rights (ss.
92(13))).
24
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, (1968) 7 I.L.M. 1046 [hereinafter
New York Convention], available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral
/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NY Convention.html
25
Id.
26
Edward C. Chiasson, Canada No Man’s Land No More, 3 J. INT’L
ARB. 67 (1986).
27
E.g. Edward C. Chiasson & Marc Lalonde, Recent Canadian
Legislation on Arbitration 2 ARB. INT’L 370 (1986); Chiasson, supra note 25.
21
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Given the apparent desire for consensus in ratifying the ICSID
Convention, the possibility exists that some provinces are using the
implementing legislation as a bargaining chip in federal-provincial
negotiations with regard to other issues. Another possibility why
Canada has not implemented the legislation is that legislative agendas
are crowded and seeking consensus in putting forward ratification
legislation on an international treaty may simply not be a political
priority.
Unfortunately, Canadian corporations that invest
internationally have done little to press for ratification. Moreover, it
may be an unfortunate political reality that treaty ratification is not a
“vote-getting” issue.
Regardless of the reasons for the delay, it has never been suggested
that concerns about the merits of ICSID is any part of the problem. 28
When Canada’s House of Commons considered ratification legislation,
Members of Parliament, from all parties and regions, generally agreed
that ratification is in Canada’s interest.29 Indeed, in the many years
since ICSID came into existence, irrespective of the governing political
party at any point in time, Canada’s federal government has been trying
to get the provincial and territorial governments to not only commit to
act, but to actually act.30

C. MOVING WITHOUT FULL SUPPORT?
Some signs indicate that Canada’s federal government might move
to ratify the Convention despite the lack of implementing legislation in
all of its provinces and territories. One indication came during
parliamentary debates and hearings when Parliament was considering
28

Some commentators have raised the issue that ratification of the ICSID
Convention deserves thoughtful consideration given the limited possibilities for
review of ICSID awards. At the moment, all arbitral awards against Canada can
be challenged before domestic courts where public policy considerations can be
taken into account. An award made by an ICSID tribunal, however, can only be
challenged in annulment proceedings before a tribunal internally appointed by
ICSID on very narrow grounds. See generally J. Anthony Vanduzer &
Anthony R. Daimsis, A Closer Look at Canada’s Imminent Accession to the
ICSID Convention, 35 CAN. COUNCIL ON INT’L. L. BULLETIN (ELECTRONIC)
(2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1474319.
29
Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 39th Parliament, 1st
Session, vol. 141, issue 154, May 15, 2007, available at http://www.parl
.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=2945948&Language=E&M
ode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1.
30
Id.
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federal implementing legislation.31 Parliamentarians and officials
stated that Canada could designate the provinces and territories that
wish to be party to ICSID as “constituent subdivisions” in accordance
with the Convention’s “federal clause.”32 Article 70 of the ICSID
Convention would allow Canada to identify, by written notice, the
provinces and territories to which the treaty would not apply. 33 These
provinces and territories would eventually be able to join once they
pass their own implementing legislation. 34
This approach, however, is not without dissent. Some opposition
members in the federal Parliament maintained that the “constituent
subdivision” approach would violate Canada’s constitutional division
of powers and would constitute a “wrongful abrogation” of the federal
government’s control over international relations.35 A definitive
constitutional position on the part of the federal government, if it has
one, has not been made public.
Another argument against this approach is that by ratifying the
ICSID Convention without implementing legislation in all provinces
31

Id.
ICSID, supra note 4, at 202.
33
Id. (“This convention shall apply to all territories for whose
international relations a Contracting State is responsible, except those which
are excluded by such State by written notice to the depositary of this
Convention either at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval or
subsequently.”)
34
Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Development. Evidence. (November 22,
2007), 39th Parliament, 2nd Session, available at http://www.parl.gc.ca
/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3133571&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses
=2&Language=E#Int-2214104. During the time when the federal
implementation legislation was being considered, then Senior General Counsel
and Director General of Canada’s Trade Law Bureau, Meg Kinnear, now
Secretary General of ICSID, testified before the Parliamentary Committee that:
“What the federal government has said to all the provinces is that if you want to
be what’s called “designated” as a constituent subdivision, just tell us and we
will do that . . . . So we have said that this is up to you, and if at any time later
you decide that you would like to be designated, just tell the federal
government. There is no problem with that, but it’s totally up to the province to
decide when they would like to do that.” Provinces that have yet to pass
supporting legislation include Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova
Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Quebec, and with the Yukon the only
territory.)
35
See generally comments of Mrs. Vivian Barbot, MP, supra note 29.
32
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and territories, Canada may be violating its treaty obligations under the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).36
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention states that “[e]very treaty in force
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith,”37 and Article 27 states that “a party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty.”38 On the international stage, Canada alone is responsible for
the actions of its constituent subdivisions and would not be able to
preclude its responsibility for an internationally wrongful act
committed by a province or territory that has not passed implementing
legislation.39 Nonetheless, as noted above, Article 70 of the ICSID
Convention seems to allow for such an arrangement so that ratification
on a constituent subdivision basis would not violate the Vienna
Convention.
Lastly, moving forward with the ratification process without full
provincial and territorial concurrency could have political implications
in Canada as a deviation from Canada’s ordinary treaty implementation
practice. Few would disagree that unanimous provincial and territorial
ratification is preferable in Canada’s federal state environment.
Moreover, partial applicability of ICSID in Canada could complicate
investment transactions and distort economic relations among
provinces and territories.
In the absence of unanimity after an unduly prolonged time and
considerable effort, the alternative of ratifying the ICSID Convention
under the “constituent subdivisions” approach may be the best
achievable option. It might also “put feet to the fire” in the footdragging provinces and territories. Given the history described above,
and the benefits that likely would come from ICSID membership,
proceeding by this approach may be in the best interests of the
Canadian economy and Canadian businesses that invest internationally.

36
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
37
Id. at 339, 8 I.L.M. at 690.
38
Id.
39
See BARNETT, supra note 19 and infra note 60 and accompanying text.
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D. EXAMPLES WHERE ACCESS TO ICSID ARBITRATION MIGHT BE
RELEVANT
Recently, there have been instances in which Canadian investors
may have benefitted in having access to arbitration under ICSID
Convention.
First Quantum Minerals v. Democratic Republic of Congo
First Quantum Minerals Ltd. (First Quantum)’s dispute with the
Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the most publicized examples of a
Canadian company investing in a foreign country that could have
benefitted from Canada’s membership to ICSID. In 1997, First
Quantum, agreed to invest US $553 million in a copper mining project
in the DRC.40 In exchange, First Quantum got the rights to build and
operate the mine for at least twenty-two years.41 However, after First
Quantum had put into place eighty percent of the mining infrastructure,
the DRC government seized the mine and declared the contract
cancelled.42
Canada does not have a FIPA with the DRC, however, the DRC is
a member of ICSID and provides for ICSID arbitration through its
Mining Code.43 As Canada is not a Contracting State of ICSID, First
Quantum could not bring its claim under ICSID. Nonetheless, DRC’s
Mining Code also provides that nationals whose home state is not an
ICSID member can bring a dispute “to any arbitration tribunal of their
choice.”44 In February 2010, First Quantum, and its co-investors in the
40
Uzma Sulaiman, Investing in the DRC: Horror or Hope?, 5 GLOBAL
ARB. REV. Iss. 2 (2010), available at http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com
/journal/article/28366/investing-drc-horror-hope.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
“[D]isputes which might result from the interpretation or application of
the provisions of the present Code may be settled, at the request of the party
who proceeds first, by arbitration in accordance with the Convention on the
Settlement of Disputes Relating to Investments between the State and Nationals
of other States, provided that the holder is a “National” of another contracting
state according to the terms of Article 25 of said convention.” Mining Code,
Law No. 007/2002 of July 11, 2002, art 319 ¶ 1, http://www.miningcongo.cd
/codeminier/codeminier_eng.pdf.
44
Id. art. 319 ¶ 3. “Holders who are not Nationals of another contracting
state may submit disputes resulting from the interpretation or application of the
provisions of the present Code to any arbitration tribunal of their choice, but
must notify the Government of the name, address and regulations of the
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DRC project, the International Finance Corporation and South Africa’s
Industrial Development Corporation, initiated International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) arbitration in Paris against the DRC. 45
In August 2010, the DRC withdrew another of First Quantum’s
mining permits and ordered it to leave. 46 First Quantum asserted that
DRC’s action was an act of retribution for its commencement of ICC
arbitration over its initial project.47 With regard to this latest dispute,
First Quantum has circumvented Canada’s failure to ratify the ICSID
Convention by registering the dispute with ICSID in October 2010
through its Barbadian subsidiary, International Quantum Resources
Limited.48 Barbados has been a party to the ICSID Convention since
1983.49

Canadian Gold Mining Companies in Venezuela
Further examples of Canadian foreign investors that could have
used the benefits of the ICSID Convention include three gold mining
companies with operations in Venezuela. Before President Hugo
Chavez nationalized all gold mines in Venezuela in August 2011,50
arbitration tribunal on the date on which the mining title is issued at the Mining
Registry.”
45
SULAIMAN, supra note 40; see also Andrew de Lotbinière McDougall,
Is the System Working: What Lessons Can Be Learned From A Canadian
Trilogy Of Investor Claims (AbitibiBowater, Chemtura, First Quantum
Minerals)?,
KLUWER
ARB.
BLOG,
(Sept.
15,
2010),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/
2010/09/15/is-the-system-workingwhat-lessons-can-be-learned-from-a-canadian-trilogy-of-investor-claimsabitibibowater-chemtura-first-quantum-minerals/.
46
Press Release, First Quantum Minerals Ltd., First Quantum Minerals
Announces the Suspension of Operations at its Frontier Mine in the Dem. Rep.
Congo (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.mining-reporter.com/index.php/
component/content/article/348-first-quantum-minerals-ltd/4947-first-quantumminerals-announces-the-suspension-of-operations-at-its-frontier-mine-in-thedemocratic-republic-of-congo.
47
Id.
48
See ICSID, List of Pending Cases at No. 98, ICSID (last updated Sep.
22, 2010), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=Gen
CaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending (listing Int’l Quantum Resources Ltd. v.
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/21, Filed (Oct.
22, 2010)).
49
ICSID, List of Contracting States, supra note 5.
50
Hugo Chavez Officially Nationalizes Venezuela’s Gold Industry,
HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 23, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/24/
venezuela-gold-industry-huge-chavez_n_934968.html.
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three Canadian companies, Vanessa Ventures Ltd. (now Infinito Gold
Ltd.), Gold Reserve Inc., and Crystallex International Corporation, had
outstanding claims against the country. 51 Although Canada has a FIPA
with Venezuela,52 all three cases are proceeding by way of the ICSID
Additional Facility Rules. Under these rules, any award in favor of an
investor that the investor attempts to enforce in Venezuela would be
subject to review by Venezuelan courts.

E. NEXT STEPS
Canadian international arbitration and trade law practitioners have
long attempted to persuade senior Canadian federal and provincial
government officials that it is in Canada’s interest to join ICSID.
Canada’s ratification of the ICSID Convention is now regularly raised
by Canadian international arbitration and trade law organizations,
including through the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the
Canadian Bar Association.53 The availability of binding ICSID
arbitration would increase investor confidence in Canada because it
would reduce investor risk and make Canada an even more attractive
location for foreign investment. Moreover, Canadians investing in
foreign countries would similarly enjoy reduced risks and reduced costs
in their foreign investment activities. The majority of countries in
which Canadian companies most frequently and most heavily invest are
ICSID members (excluding Mexico, India, and Brazil).54

51

See ICSID, List of Pending Cases, supra note 5, (listing Vannessa
Ventures Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/04/6, Filed (Oct. 28, 2004); Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Filed (Nov. 9, 2009); Crystallex
Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/11/2, Filed (Mar. 9, 2011)).
52
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of
the Republic of Venezuela for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Can.-Venez.,
Jul.
1,
1996,
2221
UNTS
7,
available
at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202221/v2221.pdf.
53
Andrew McDougall & Barry Leon, Upcoming G20 Meeting in Canada
Presents an Opportunity for Canada to Join ICSID, N. AM. FREE TRADE & INV,
REPORT, March 31, 2010, http://www.perlaw.ca/ media/Lawyer_Articles_PDF/
Published_BLeon_and_AMcDougall_Upcoming_G20_Meeting_in_Canada_Pr
esents_an_Opportunity_for_Canada_to_Join_ICSID_Article_Only.pdf.
54
See ICSID, List of Contracting States, supra note 5.
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Until the necessary implementing legislation is brought into force
throughout the country, or Canada’s federal government decides to
proceed with ratification without all of the provinces and territories on
board, the ICSID Convention does not protect Canadian international
investors or foreign investors investing in Canada. Thus, Canada is
risking significant economic benefits. As one of the two G-8
countries55 and one of the three OECD members 56 that have not ratified
the ICSID Convention, Canada seems long overdue to provide foreign
investors and Canadians investing internationally with the full
protections and benefits that come with ICSID membership. 57

II. ITAS AND FEDERALISM: WHO’S LEFT HOLDING THE BILL?
Another issue between the federal government and provinces and
territories is who should be liable for the damages awarded against
Canada in an ITA arbitration when the actions of a constituent
subdivision (a sub-federal entity) constituted the breach of the treaty
obligation. This issue came to the fore with Canada’s recent settlement
with AbitibiBowater Inc. regarding the province of Newfoundland and
Labrador’s alleged violation of AbitibiBowater’s investments rights
through an act of its provincial legislature.
In April 2009,
AbitibiBowater, a forestry company incorporated in the United States,
initiated NAFTA Chapter Eleven arbitration for CDN $500 million
claiming that Canada had breached its obligations as a result of
Newfoundland and Labrador’s Bill 75, entitled An Act to Return to the
Crown Certain Rights Relating to Timber and Water use Vested in
Abitibi-Consolidated and to Expropriate Assets and Lands Associated
with the Generation of Electricity Enabled by Those Water Use Rights
(Act).58
The Act essentially served to expropriate most of
AbitibiBowater’s investments in the province, including its timber and
water rights. Only a state party to NAFTA (Canada, United States, or
Mexico) can be liable to compensate an investor from another NAFTA
party for a breach of Chapter Eleven.59 One of the key investment
55

Id. Russia has yet to ratify the Convention although it signed the treaty

in 1992.
56

Id. Mexico and Poland have not signed the Convention.
See Barry Leon & Andrew de Lotbinière McDougall, Why has Canada
Not Ratified the ICSID Convention?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (August 24, 2010,
9:15 PM), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/08/24/why-has-canadanot-ratified-the-icsid-convention/.
58
Abitibi-Consolidated Rights and Assets Act, R.S.N.L. 2008, c. A-1.01.
59
NAFTA, supra note 3.
57
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protection provisions of Chapter Eleven is Article 1110 which prevents
a NAFTA party from expropriating the investments of an investor from
another NAFTA party without fair compensation. 60
Canada settled the claim for CDN $130 million in August 2010,
leading to a consent award in December 2010.61 The settlement was
not without controversy as some commentators questioned whether
Canada should have settled, and the amount for which it settled. 62 The
federal government could have continued on with the arbitration,
covered all related costs, and been left with the option of trying to
distance itself from an unfavorable award. Instead, the settlement
demonstrates that the investment treaty protection system under
NAFTA works and that Canada recognizes its importance and, in
appropriate circumstances, the need to voluntarily honor the investor
protection commitments it has made.
The settlement highlighted a particular challenge of ITAs, such as
NAFTA, in federal states like Canada, the United States, and Mexico.
As noted, the actions leading to the claim were not ones of Canada’s
federal government but actions of one of Canada’s provinces.
However, in accordance with NAFTA, the claim was brought against
the federal state which had to defend and ultimately settle the claim.
This demonstrates how a state can be financially responsible for its
constituent subdivisions and be left to pay for actions that it did not
take and had no constitutional or practical authority to prevent.
Following the settlement, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper
stated that the federal government did not intend to seek reimbursement
from Newfoundland and Labrador, but that in the future, “should
provincial actions cause significant legal obligations for the
60

Id. at art.1110(1), (“No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or
expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take
a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment
(“expropriation”), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory
basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and (d) on
payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.”)
61
AbitibiBowater Inc. v. The Gov’t of Canada, (ICSID) Consent Award,
Dec. 15, 2010, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Abitibi_Consent_Award_Dec_15_2010.pdf.
62
Scott Sinclair, $130 Million NAFTA Payout Sets Troubling Precedent,
CANADIAN Ctr. FOR POLICY ALT. (March 22, 2011), http://www.policy
alternatives.ca/publications/commentary/130-million-nafta-payout-setstroubling-precedent.
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government of Canada, the government of Canada will create a
mechanism so that it can reclaim monies lost through international
trade processes.”63
There has been no clarification of what that mechanism would be
or whether it would be imposed unilaterally. Nonetheless, financial
arrangements between the federal government and provinces and
territories are most often cooperatively negotiated. 64 Whatever the
arrangement, the federal government may have to move quickly
because NAFTA Chapter Eleven complaints65 continue to be brought
as a result of provincial and territorial actions. 66 Many aspects of
environmental, human health and property regulation fall under
provincial and territorial constitutional jurisdiction and are likely to
continue to be a source of future claims.

A. NAFTA CASES RELATING TO PROVINCIAL MEASURES
Canada had two new NAFTA notices filed against it in 2011 based
on Ontario’s environmental regulations. First, St. Mary’s Cement, a
United States corporation, filed a Notice of Intent on May 11, 2011,
63
Bertrand Marotte & John Ibbitson, Provinces on Hook for Future
Trade Disputes: Harper, THE GLOBE & MAIL (August 26, 2010),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/abitibi-deal-bestavailable-harper/article1686431/?cmpid=rss1.
64
See HOGG, supra note 21, at ¶ 6.9.
65
NAFTA Chapter Eleven complaints are first brought by way of a
“Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration” before a claim is formalized
under a “Notice of Arbitration.” Some complaints do not progress past the
Notice of Intent. Of the six active complaints relating to constituent subdivision
measures, the three most recent complaints have yet to progress past their
Notice of Intent: John R. Andre (U.S.) v. Gov’t of Canada, Notice of Intent
(Mar. 19, 2010); St. Marys VCNA, LLC (U.S.) v. Gov’t of Canada, Notice of
Intent (May 13, 2011); and, Mesa Power Group LLC (U.S.) v. Gov’t of
Canada, Notice of Intent (July 6, 2011).
66
Clayton/Bilcon (U.S.) v. Gov’t of Canada, Statement of the Claim
(Jan. 30, 2009); John R. Andre (U.S.) v. Gov’t of Canada, Notice of Intent
(Mar. 19, 2010); Mobil Investments Inc. and Murphy Oil Corporation v. Gov’t
of Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF) 07/4, Request for Arbitration (Nov. 1,
2007); St. Marys VCNA, LLC (U.S.)v. Gov’t of Canada, Notice of Intent (May
13, 2011); Mesa Power Group LLC (U.S.) v. Gov’t of Canada, Notice of Intent
(July 6, 2011), and V.G. Gallo (U.S.) v. Gov’t of Canada, Statement of the
Claim (June 23, 2008). See Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada,
Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada, http://www.international.
gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/gov.aspx?lang=en&
view=d.
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alleging that the denial of a quarry permit by the Ontario government
was discriminatory and motivated by political concerns in breach of
NAFTA Chapter Eleven’s fair and equitable treatment obligations. 67
Second, Mesa Power served its Notice of Intent on July 6, 2011,
complaining that Ontario’s Green Energy Act68 resulted in denials of
access to the feed-in-tariff (FIT) program for a number of wind power
projects in southwestern Ontario owned by the American corporation. 69
Mesa Power Group asserts that changes in regulations for granting
access to the electricity grid and awarding wind power contracts led to
a decline in the value of its projects under the FIT program and
contravened Canada’s NAFTA obligations. 70
These two cases join the list of four other ongoing NAFTA
Chapter Eleven complaints against Canada resulting from provincial
and territorial measures.71 It appears that the issue of constituent
subdivision responsibility for actions giving rise to ITA claims will
need to be dealt with in Canada sooner rather than later. In response to
Canada’s settlement with AbitibiBowater, one lead editorial in
Canada’s principal mainstream newspaper has already called for a
solution:
[T]he federal government should not simply wait for
the next problem of this kind to come up. It should
diplomatically, but firmly, make clear to the
provinces that it is thinking about specific options.
The taxpayers of Canada need some concrete

67

See St. Marys VCNA, LLC v. Gov’t of Canada, Notice of Intent (filed
May 13, 2011) available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreementsaccords-commerciaux/disp-diff/st_marys_vcna.aspx?lang=eng&view=d.
68
Green Energy Act, S.O. 2009, c. 12, Sch. A (Can. Ont.).
69
Mesa Power Group LLC v. Gov’t of Canada, Notice of Intent (filed
July 6, 2011) available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreementsaccords-commerciaux/disp-diff/mesa.aspx?lang=eng&view=d.
70
Id.
71
Clayton/Bilcon v. Canada, Notice of Intent (filed Feb. 5, 2008) (N.S.);
John R. Andre v. Canada, Notice of Intent (filed Mar. 19, 2010) (N.W.T.);
Mobil Invs, Inc. and Murphy Oil Corp. v. Canada Notice of Intent, (filed Aug.
3, 2007) (Nfld. & L.); V.G. Gallo v. Canada, Notice of Intent (filed Oct. 12,
2006) (Ont.), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreementsaccords-commerciaux/disp-diff/gov.aspx?lang=en&view=d.
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assurance that they will not have to pick up another
such tab.72
Until the federal government establishes an arrangement with its
provinces and territories regarding the costs of ITA claims that are
based on the actions of a constituent subdivision, the federal
government is left in the position of defending these claims without any
assurance that its sub-federal entities will cooperate and help cover the
financial costs of settling claims and satisfying awards. Canada’s
NAFTA partners, the United States and Mexico, both of which are
federal states, may also need to consider developing comprehensive
solutions to this issue.73

III. HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION REGULATIONS
– CHEMTURA CORP. V. CANADA
Canada’s experience with NAFTA Chapter Eleven arbitration
appears to have placed it at the forefront of responding to investor-state
claims relating to health and environmental protection regulation.
Canada has risen to prominence given its victory in the NAFTA case
Chemtura v. Canada.74
Chemtura Corporation, an American
agricultural pesticide products manufacturer, alleged that, through its
Pest Management Regulatory Agency (PMRA), the government of
Canada wrongfully terminated Chemtura’s pesticide business in
lindane-based products.75 Chemtura claimed that Canada breached its
NAFTA Chapter Eleven obligations through its regulatory actions, in
particular Article 1110 (Expropriation) and Article 1105 (Minimum
Standard of Treatment/Fair and Equitable Treatment). 76 Not only did
72
Editorial, How Ottawa could avoid getting stuck with the provinces’
bills, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 29, 2010, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/opinions/editorials/how-ottawa-could-avoid-getting-stuck-with-theprovinces-bills/article1688337/.
73
See also Barry Leon & Andrew McDougall, Left Holding the Bill: Can
the NAFTA Countries Recover from Their Constituent Territories?, N. AM.
FREE TRADE & INV. REP., Vol. 21, No. 1, Jan. 1, 2011, available at
http://www.perlaw.ca/en/newsroom/publications/2011/1/1/left-holding-the-billcan-the-nafta-countries-recover; McDougall, Is the System Working, supra note
45.
74
Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Award, Aug. 2,
2010 [Chemtura], available at http://www.international.gc.ca/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/crompton.aspx?lang=en&view=d.
75
Id. at ¶ 7.
76
NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1110 & 1105.
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the unanimous tribunal reject Chemtura’s US $80.2 million claim, it
ordered Chemtura to pay for the costs of the arbitration, including
approximately CDN $3 million towards Canada’s legal fees. 77 The
arbitral tribunal found that the PMRA “took measures within its
mandate, in a non-discriminatory manner, motivated by the increasing
awareness of the dangers presented by lindane for human health and the
environment.”78 The tribunal held that the “the measure adopted under
such circumstances is a valid exercise of [Canada]’s police powers and,
as a result, does not constitute [a violation of Canada’s NAFTA
Chapter Eleven obligations].”79
The decision in Chemtura is significant in relation to investor
claims based on health and environmental protection regulation. The
award demonstrates that legitimate measures do not necessarily conflict
with a state’s ITA obligations.80 A longstanding criticism of investorstate arbitration is that it affords investors of the host state’s ITA
partner greater rights than that of its own domestic investors, while at
the same time curtailing a state’s public policy choices.81 Arguably,
this criticism of the potential chilling effect of investor-state arbitration
on public regulations was initially merited given Canada’s first
experience under NAFTA Chapter Eleven.
Ethyl v. Canada
In Ethyl v. Canada, Canada settled a claim by the American
chemical producer that its import ban of a gasoline additive, MMT, was
contrary to NAFTA’s investor protections. 82 A key factor in Canada’s
decision to settle the case was the lack of scientific evidence available
to support the ban.83
In its Statement of Defence, Canada
77

Id.
Id. at ¶ 266.
79
Id.
80
See also McDougall, Is the System Working, supra note 45.
81
See Howard Mann & Konrad von Moltke, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and
the Environment: Addressing the Impacts of the Investor-State Process on the
Environment, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., at 13-14 (1999) available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/nafta.pdf; see also Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto,
Environmental and Health Regulation: Assessing Liability Under Investment
Treaties 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1. (2011).
82
Ethyl Corp. v. Gov’t of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Statement of
Claim (Oct. 2, 1997), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/ethyl3.pdf.
83
Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 81, at 29.
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acknowledged that the effects of low quantities of MMT were
unknown. However, Canada argued that its measure was not
expropriatory “because it involve[d] the exercise of regulatory power or
‘police’ power” and that “the Act was enacted for the maintenance of
health, for the conservation of clean air and for the protection of the
environment.”84 Having lost its jurisdictional argument85 and three
similar challenges under the dispute settlement mechanisms of the
Agreement on Internal Trade,86 Canada repealed the ban and paid Ethyl
US $19.3 million.87
Critics of the settlement found it disturbing that NAFTA enabled
Ethyl to compel a foreign government to lift a ban, something which
Ethyl could not have compelled its own domestic government to do.88
Despite the fact that a state should be able to adopt regulations to
protect against potential health and environmental threats, a foreign
investor should not bear the risks of the state adopting a measure that is
not scientifically supported.89 The same reasoning also applies where a
state tries to cast a measure as a health or environmental regulation in
order to justify its imposition, which was Canada’s experience in S.D.
Myers v. Canada.90
S.D. Myers v. Canada
Canada’s next foray into NAFTA Chapter Eleven arbitration
relating to health and environmental protection regulations dealt with
its temporary export ban on PCB waste in late 1995. In S.D. Myers v.
Canada, an American investor claimed that the export ban breached
84

Ethyl Corp. v. Gov’t of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Statement of
Defence ¶ 95 (Nov. 27, 1997), available at http://www.international.gc.ca
/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/ethyl4.pdf.
85
Ethyl Corp. v. Gov’t of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Preliminary
Tribunal Award on Jurisdiction (June 24, 1998), available at
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/ethyl6.pdf.
86
See Agreement on International Trade, Consolidated Version, Canada,
July, 1, 1995, available at http://www.ait-aci.ca/index_en/ait.htm.
87
Shawn McCarthy, Failed Ban Becomes Selling Point for MMT, THE
GLOBE & MAIL. July 21, 1998, at A3.
88
H. Hammer Hill, NAFTA and Environmental Protection: The First Ten
Years 6 J.I.J.I.S. 157, 161 (2006).
89
Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 81, at 30.
90
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Govt. of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Partial
Award (Nov. 13, 2000), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreementsaccords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/myersvcanadapartialaward_final_13-1100.pdf.
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Canada’s NAFTA obligations.91 Canada tried to defend its actions
citing health and environmental reasons for the adoption of its
measure;92 however, statements made by Canadian officials and
government documents indicated that the real objective was to protect
domestic interests. The NAFTA tribunal held that “there was no
legitimate environmental reason for introducing the ban” as “the
documentary record as a whole clearly indicates that the Interim Order
and the Final Order [to ban the export of PCB waste] were intended
primarily to protect the Canadian PCB disposal industry from U.S.
competition.”93 While the tribunal acknowledged that government
intent is “complex and multifaceted,”94 it found that there was enough
evidence on the record to indicate Canada’s protectionist intent.95 The
tribunal held that Canada breached its national treatment (Article 1102)
and fair and equitable treatment (Article 1105) obligations and ordered
Canada to pay S.D. Myers just over CDN $6 million in damages. 96
Dow AgroSciences LLC v. Canada
In March 2009, while Chemtura was ongoing, Dow AgroSciences
LLC, a United States-based corporation, served a Notice of Arbitration
under NAFTA Chapter Eleven seeking US $2 million in damages for
losses stemming from the Government of Quebec’s ban on the sale and
certain uses of lawn pesticides containing the active ingredient 2,4-D.97
Dow AgroSciences claimed that Quebec’s actions violated its rights to
fair and equitable treatment (Article 1105) and was tantamount to
expropriation (Article 1110) under NAFTA.98 Although Quebec
claimed that it adopted the measure for health and environmental
reasons, the claimant alleged that “there was no evidence that 2,4-D
posed a health or safety risk to humans,” 99 that Quebec was aware of
91

Id.
Id. at ¶ 152.
93
Id. at ¶¶ 194-195.
94
Id. at ¶ 161.
95
Id. at ¶ 162.
96
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Govt. of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Second
Partial Award ¶ 311 (Dec. 21, 2002), http://www.international.gc.ca/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/MyersPA.pdf.
97
Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Gov’t of Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA),
Notice of Arbitration, (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.international.gc.ca/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/agrosciences_archive
.aspx?lang=en&view=d.
98
Id. ¶¶ 47-53.
99
Id. ¶ 20.
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this, and that it was motivated by political considerations rather than
any legitimate scientific concerns.100
Given the similar fact scenario involving the ban of a chemical,
the case bore a close resemblance to Chemtura. It does not appear to
be a coincidence that Dow AgroSciences settled its claim soon after the
Chemtura award was rendered.101 The settlement was reached without
resort to arbitration. Under the terms of the settlement, Quebec
maintained its ban on 2,4-D and Dow AgroSciences did not receive any
compensation. Quebec, however, acknowledged the Department of
Health Canada’s conclusion that products containing 2,4-D do not pose
an unacceptable risk to human health or the environment provided that
users follow the instructions on the label. 102 Following the settlement,
Canada’s Minister of International Trade stated that “[t]his agreement
with Dow AgroSciences demonstrates that the NAFTA dispute
settlement mechanism works,” and that the agreement “confirms the
right of governments to regulate the use of pesticides [which] will not
be compromised by Canada’s participation in NAFTA or any other
trade agreement.”103
The result in Dow AgroSciences and the decision in Chemtura
demonstrate that states are able to make legitimate policy decisions
based on sound scientific evidence and, at the same time, comply with
their obligations in ITAs. Experience has also shown that political
motivations masked as public policy concerns will not stand the
scrutiny of investor-state tribunals.

IV. CONCLUSION
Canada has been, and likely will continue to be, a dynamic
participant in international investment arbitration. While Canadian
foreign investors are increasingly active internationally and Canada
continues to be an attractive venue for foreign investment, Canada’s
100

Id. ¶ 25.
Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of
Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Settlement Agreement (May 25, 2011),
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/dispdiff/agrosciences_archive.aspx?lang=en&view=d.
102
Id.
103
Press Release, Foreign Affairs & Int’l Trade Canada, Canada
Welcomes Agreement with Dow AgroSciences (May 27, 2011),
http://www.international.gc.ca/media_commerce/comm/newscommuniques/2011/145.aspx?view=d.
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ratification of the ICSID Convention would only further complement
both fronts. There are some encouraging signs as Canada’s business
and legal communities are drawing greater attention to Canada’s failure
to ratify the ICSID Convention.
Canada’s federal structure plays an important part in its situation
regarding ICSID, just as it plays an important part in its inability to
hold its constituent subdivisions accountable for their breaches of
Canada’s ITA obligations. However, the knife cuts both ways. Critics
argue that Canada’s federal government should not use its treatymaking power to impose broad foreign investor rights that constrain the
ability of provincial and territorial governments to legislate and
regulate on behalf of their citizens in areas of exclusive provincial and
territorial jurisdiction.104 One commentator has gone so far as to say
that “[w]e are witnessing a constitutional train wreck in slow
motion.”105
Whether this train wreck will ever happen remains to be seen.
Canada’s experience with ITA claims relating to health and
environmental protection measures offer hope that it can be avoided.
Canada’s experience shows that provincial, territorial and federal
public policy measures can align with Canada’s ITA obligations. In
moving forward, Canada can remain confident that the dispute
settlement mechanisms in its investment treaties can and do work.

104
105

SINCLAIR, supra note 62.
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